"Shared Ideal, Divergent Strategies? Explaining Similarities and Differences in E.U. and U.S. Democracy Promotion" by Magen, Amichai & McFaul, Michael
- DRAFT: NOT TO BE ATTRIBUTED OR CITED WITHOUT THE AUTHORS’ 





SHARED IDEAL, DIVERGENT STRATEGIES?  












By the turn of the 21
st century liberal democracy and democracy promotion have both 
become strongly entrenched norms in U.S. and E.U. foreign policies. Despite squabbles 
over a host of international issues, democracy as a system of government and an ideal is 
fundamentally shared by Americans and Europeans. Moreover, the erosion of state 
sovereignty and principles of non-intervention, as well as growing appreciation of the 
links between substantive democracy and economic development, peace and security, 
have made the goal of democracy promotion a shared one for Americans and Europeans. 
We argue that contemporary Europe and the United States are united by a normative 
commitment to democracy and the objective of supporting and promoting its 
development outside the transatlantic community. But does this mean that the E.U. and 
U.S. pursue the same democracy promotion strategies? We suggest that the answer is 
“sometimes, and sometimes not” and that it is dynamic. At times, and in different 
contexts, E.U. and U.S. strategies and instruments converge and diverge. Finally, we 
argue that divergence in strategies can be explained with reference to three key factors: 
the different histories and formative experiences that have shaped E.U. and U.S. thinking 
and institutions for promoting democracy abroad; differences in international “actorship”; 
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 In response to the September 11, 2001 attacks against the United States, President 
George W. Bush elevated rhetorically the promotion of liberty and democracy abroad to a 
central position in United States (US) foreign policy. In numerous statements, including 
his second inaugural address, President Bush has outlined a full-throated explanation for 
why the promotion of democracy is both a moral imperative and a central security 
interest for the United States. Although Bush has focused his remarks and American 
resources on the greater Middle East, he also has emphasized that the American mission 
of democracy promotion is global in scope.  
President Bush has made it clear that he wants the mission to be shared by all 
established democracies, and especially by America’s oldest allies in Europe. In his 
February 2005 charm offensive on Brussels, Bush called upon Europeans to encourage 
democratic transformations in the broader Middle East “by taking up the duties of great 
democracies” and renewing “our great alliance of freedom.”
i Similarly, in June 2005, 
Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, Nicholas Burns, told delegates at a 
Transatlantic Democracy Network conference in Brussels that “the great common 
project” for Americans and Europeans was no longer the Cold War or the preservation of 
democracy in Europe, but “what we can do outside the transatlantic relationship to 
preserve peace and security and democracy around the world.”
ii  In June 2004, Bush tried 
to use the prerogative of the chair in hosting the G8 summit to launch a Greater Middle 
East Initiative (GMEI), a project which aims to marshal American and European 
diplomatic and financial resources to press for greater political liberalization primarily in 
the Arab world.  
Well before G8 leaders convened at Sea Island, Georgia, however, serious 
disagreements between Americans and Europeans erupted over the definition of the 
mission statement and the compatibility of European versus American approaches to 
democracy promotion.
iii Europeans leaked drafts of the Sea Island documents as a way to 
embarrass the Americans for what they called imperialism, and stressed instead that the 
European Union already has its own European instruments to encourage democratic 
institutions in North Africa and the Middle East – the Barcelona Process and the 
European Neighbourhood Policy. Most tellingly, some European leaders wanted to 
remove the word, democracy, from the Sea Island documents altogether, and insert the 
word modernization in its stead. Eventually, G8 leaders did launch the Broader Middle 
East and North Africa (BMENA) initiative, but the ambition reflected in the documents 
was far more modest than the Americans had wished, and bad feelings persisted.  
On both sides of the Atlantic, the See Island rift seemed to confirm what Robert 
Kagan had observed years before – Americans and Europeans no longer shared a 
common understanding or strategic vision about the international order.
iv  
American officials now identified threats to U.S. national security as coming primarily 
from badly governed countries or autocratic regimes hostile to the United States. Part of 
the strategy for diminishing these threats, from the American perspective, was projecting 
democratic values and institutions into hostile, Hobbesian regions of the world. As 
President Bush stated explicitly in his second inaugural address, “The survival of liberty 
in our land depends on the success of liberty in others lands.”
v By contrast, many 
Americans believed that European leaders did not perceive these threats from the 
periphery in the same way, did not believe that the promotion of democracy would lessen 
them, and were deeply sceptical that any joint effort with the United States to promote democracy outside the transatlantic community would succeed. A secondary accusation 
was that Europeans were not serious about promoting democracy, preferring to let the 
United States shoulder the hard burden while Europe luxuriates in the role of “the good 
guy” and serves its own economic interests. 
In parallel, many European foreign policy elites have greeted American official 
statements about democracy and human rights with incredulity. Fearing a new and radical 
brand of American imperialism, many Europeans have warned repeatedly that the United 
States should not seek to promote democracy “through the barrel of a gun.” And although 
the decision to invade Iraq was at the time only tangentially linked to the democracy 
promotion project, in the minds of many the Bush administration’s wider democratic 
vision has been thoroughly sullied by association. A voluble European narrative has, in 
other words, come to portray American “democracy promotion” pejoratively, as forming 
one of three pillars of a wider failed Bush doctrine, which also includes, according to the 
detractors, disdain for multilateral institutions and a penchant for the use of pre-emptive 
military force.  
Couched in these terms, it is hardly surprising that some Europeans have gone to 
great lengths to sharply distinguish the goals and means of EU external policy from those 
of the United States, not least in the area of democracy promotion. As many Europeans 
found themselves in vehement disagreement with the Bush administration’s position not 
only on Iraq, but on world trade, the Kyoto Protocol on Global Warming and the 
International Criminal Court (ICC), they found it difficult to separate their displeasure 
over these issues from the more specific focus on democracy promotion. In some 
European quarters, agreeing with President Bush on anything became a politically 
unfashionable  faux pas.
vi The caricatures – whereby the White House bullishly 
champions the “spread of liberty” around the globe, while Europe urges caution and 
seeks stability instead – have thus infected elite perceptions, and distorted policy 
deliberations.
vii  
This paper constitutes a draft introductory chapter to a volume that seeks to 
explore this hypothesis about European and American conceptions of international order 
and their consequent approaches to democracy promotion.
viii Is the current clash in 
European and American thinking about democracy promotion real or wrongly perceived? 
Are American and European approaches to democracy promotion fundamentally 
different and at odds with each other or actually similar and compatible? Are there gains 
to be made from greater coordination between European and American policies, or are 
the two sides of the Atlantic more successful in promoting if they work independently?  
The analysis presented in the chapters of the collection offers a different, more 
nuanced assessment of the similarities and differences in European versus American 
approaches to democracy promotion. On the goal of democracy promotion, we see more 
agreement, than discord.  The “West” broadly defined still shares a common set of 
principles about governance that both sides of the Atlantic still believe are worth 
propagating.  On the tools and tactics of democracy promotion practiced by European and 
American actors, our study also uncovers more shared practices than competing 
approaches. European governmental agencies and non-governmental organizations 
(NGOs) in the business of promoting democracy deploy many similar techniques to their 
American counterparts. Both sets of institutions grapple with substantially identical 
challenges of project design, implementation and evaluation of outcomes. It is in the development of national strategies towards autocratic regimes that American and 
European approaches sometimes differ. These differences are principally a function of the 
different types and capacities of power that Europeans and Americans can deploy in the 
name of democracy promotion. Put simply, European states have limited coercive 
capacities to destroy autocratic regimes. Rather than confrontation, therefore, Europe’s 
default mode for inducing internal change is “transformative engagement” and 
integration.
ix American leaders also practice engagement and integration as strategies for 
fostering regime change, but indirectly through multilateral institutions, and with lesser 
institutional density than the one achieved in Europe.
x On rare occasions, however, 
American leaders have also pursued more coercive strategies, including at time military 
intervention, to foster democratic regime change.  
 
 
SHARED NORMS, OBJECTIVES, AND ANALYTIC FRAMEWORKS 
 
 
Hyperbolic statements about American imperialism and European weakness mask 
substantial agreement between Europeans and Americans about the value of democracy 
and democracy promotion as a foreign policy objective. Democracy as an international 
norm is stronger than ever before, while the promotion of democracy has become a 
legitimate foreign policy priority for both Americans and Europeans.
xi   
 
Democracy’s Triumph as a System and Ideal 
 
The first and most important cause of this normative consensus between 
Europeans and Americans about the value of democracy is the growing success of 
democracy and democratization over the past two decades and the commensurate 
declining appeal of alternative models of government. Seventy years ago, proponents of 
non-democratic regime types enjoyed audiences and support in Europe. Thirty years ago, 
the continent was divided between democratic and communist regimes. Because this 
ideological divide was so central to American and European strategic thinking, Western 
democracies tolerated and at times defended anti-communist, autocratic regimes as allies.  
Western leaders even made decisions to engage regimes in the communist world based in 
large measure by geo-strategic concerns.  In the 1970s and 80s, for instance, both 
Americans and Europeans supported the odious Ceauscescu regime in Romania because 
of its anti-Soviet tendencies. In a bi-polar world, the two hegemons fostered loyal 
protégés above all else; their grand strategic concerns discouraged political 
experimentations.
xii  
The end of the Cold War not only allowed for the expansion of democratic 
practices into the former communist world, but it also eliminated a chief rational for 
tolerating autocratic practices in the non-communist world. For instance, as a bulwark 
against communist expansion in southern Africa, the apartheid regime in South Africa 
could win supporters among Western democracies. The disappearance of world 
communist threat, however, also undermined the already weak tolerance for this South 
Africa’s dictators and many others. The collapse of the Soviet Union as a counterweight 
to American power also made more aggressive uses of U.S. and European military, diplomatic, and economic power in the name of democracy promotion less risky. The 
larger role played by international actors (states, international organizations such as 
NATO and the European Union, and NGOs) in the democratic transformation of Central 
and Eastern Europe and post-conflict stabilization of the Balkans has brought 
international dimensions of democratization to the fore.
xiii  A t  t h e  s a m e  t i m e ,  m o r e  
international actors now wield more resources and deploy more intrusive monitoring 
instruments than ever before in the name of human rights, good governance and 
democracy. Although obtaining exact, comparable figures of Western spending on 
democracy promotion remains difficult, it is clear that both Americans and Europeans 
have significantly increased funding for democracy assistance across a host of 
development, educational and conflict-resolution programs in the post-cold war period. 
Using donor’s own varied political assistance categories for 2001, for example, Richard 
Youngs estimates an approximate overall EU budget of $900 million, compared to $633 
million in USAID allocation for the same period.
xiv By 2005 total United States 
government spending on democracy assistance (discounting post-war efforts in 
Afghanistan and Iraq) climbed to approximately $1.5 billion, an amount roughly matched 
overall EU and individual European countries’ spending.  
Even where authoritarians still prevail, they no longer champion an alternative 
form of government, but either claim that their regimes are democratic (as in Russia or 
Uganda) or that they are moving their countries gradually towards democracy (as in 
China, Egypt or Saudi Arabia). Even the most vehement proponents of illiberal, 
autocratic practices, including terrorist leaders, have felt compelled to incorporate 
democratic discourse in their political appeals.   
Moreover, the appeal of the democratic ideas has produced a sea change in the 
way that the world is governed. By 2003, the number of democratic states in the world 
had grown from 39 in 1974 to 117, and the number of “Free States” (as rated by Freedom 
House) more than doubled, from 39 to 88.
xv
 
Eroding Norms of State Sovereignty and Non-intervention 
 
In addition to sharing a belief in the virtues of democracy, European and 
American leaders increasingly have come to embrace norms about the primacy of human 
rights over states rights. The notion of state sovereignty, although violated in practice for 
hundreds of years, has endured as a norm and continues to influence the conduct of 
international affairs.
xvi Nevertheless, during the last three decades, as new international 
rules protecting individual human rights have gained strength, the sanctity of sovereignty 
has eroded. In the 1970s and 80s, East European dissidents invoked the 1975 Helsinki 
Final Act to demand the recognition of their human rights, and eventually they 
triumphed.
xvii In the count down to the fall of communism, both Americans and Western 
Europeans concerned to promote democracy abroad drew upon human rights norms to 
legitimise their actions. Although diametrically opposed in many ways, presidents Jimmy 
Carter and Ronald Reagan both made the promotion of human rights a central theme of 
their administrations. In Europe, democracy promotion abroad made its first cursory 
appearance in European Community (EC) documents with the 1986 Statement on Human 
Rights, the foreign ministers of the Community affirming “their commitment to promote 
and protect human rights and fundamental freedoms and emphasize the importance in this context of the principles of parliamentary democracy and the rule of law.”
xviii  
The end of the Cold War greatly accelerated this trend. In 1990 the UN sent its 
first elections monitoring mission to a sovereign state, Nicaragua, and by 1992 Thomas 
Franck could make a spirited argument in favour of a “democratic entitlement” in 
international law.
xix Throughout the 1990s the status and determinacy of the right to 
political participation were strengthened through pronouncements and the crafting of 
monitoring mechanisms by international actors, including the UN General Assembly, the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) Human Rights Committee, 
the European and Inter-American Commissions on Human Rights, the Organization of 
American States (OAS), the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe 
(OSCE), and the Council of Europe.  
Most boldly, military intervention for the defence of fundamental individual 
rights has gained international legitimacy, and the protection of democracy now features 
prominently in the justification of such action. For instance, the UN Security Council 
responded vigorously to military coups against elected governments in Haiti (1991-1994) 
and Sierra Leone (1997-98), by authorizing external actors to reverse the usurping of 
power by force.
xx In 1999, Australia sent its military forces to assist transition to 
democratic government in East Timor, as did the EU in 2003 in eastern Congo.   Even 
when European and American have disagreed about the use of force, most notably 
regarding the American decision to invade Iraq, they have remained unanimously 
committed to the idea that post-conflict governments must be chosen in free and fair 
elections. 
 
Democracy and Development 
 
A third factor that has helped to produce shared support for democracy in Europe 
and the United States is a new understanding of the relationship between economic 
development and democracy. Thirty years ago, the conventional wisdom, which 
dominated development thinking and the work of international financial institutions (IFI), 
held that economic development and prosperity encourage democracy or in the words of 
Martin Lipset: “The more well-to-do a nation, the greater the chances that it will sustain 
democracy.”
xxi For policymakers, this hypothesis offered a justification for tolerating 
anti-democratic practices in developing countries, especially when as in many parts of 
East Asia, these autocratic regimes were producing impressive economic growth. In the 
last decade, however, a mass of research has challenged old assumptions about the 
relationship between regime type and development.
xxii Several major studies and political 
documents, including the World Bank’s World Development Reports since 1997, as well 
as the UNDP Human Development Reports since 2002 and the UN Secretary General’s 
2005 report: In Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security and Human Rights for 
All, have argued with supporting data that democratic government encourages economic 
development.
xxiii  The causal mechanisms between autocracy or democracy, on the one 
hand, and development, on the other, are still poorly understood. Still, there is now a 
consensus among Europeans and Americans that, at the very least, democracy need not 
be delayed to promote economic development. This paradigm shift in the development 
community has further eroded defences for autocratic rule and further enhanced the 
transatlantic commitment to democracy promotion. Accordingly, pressures are mounting on the largest providers of development aid – notably the United States and European 
Union countries – to generate a more “democracy-centred development strategy”.
xxiv
 
Democracy and Security 
 
  It is over the relationship between democracy promotion and security that serious 
analytic debates still remain between Europeans and Americans (as well as among 
Americans and among Europeans). Over the long run, few on either side of the Atlantic 
would dispute the idea that “the West” has clear security interests in seeing the spread of 
democracy around the world. The consolidation of democratic regimes in states formerly 
ruled by autocratic regimes and hostile to American and European interests has made the 
West safer. Democracies do not attack each other.
xxv This hope about the relationship 
between domestic regime type and international behaviour advanced most eloquently by 
Immanuel Kant in Perpetual Peace centuries ago received empirical validation in the 
twentieth century. Today, every democracy in the world has cordial relations with other 
democracies, while no consolidated democracy in the world seriously threatens another 
consolidated democracy. Not all dictatorships in the world are foes of the United States 
or Europe but nearly all foes of the United States have been and are dictatorships or non-
governmental organizations that embrace antidemocratic ideologies. With few 
exceptions, the countries that provide safe haven to non-state enemies of the United 
States and Europe are autocratic regimes. With rare exceptions, the median voter in 
consolidated democracies pushes extreme elements to the sidelines of the political arena. 
Democracies are also more transparent, which makes them more predictable actors in 
international politics.
xxvi
  Extrapolating from this historical experience regarding the positive security 
benefits of democracy’s advance, President Bush and his foreign policy team have argued 
forcefully since September 11
th that the expansion of democracy in the greater Middle 
East will make the United States and its European allies more secure. As Bush explained, 
“Sixty years of Western nations excusing and accommodating the lack of freedom in the 
Middle East did nothing to make us safe - because in the long run, stability cannot be 
purchased at the expense of liberty. As long as the Middle East remains a place where 
freedom does not flourish, it will remain a place of stagnation, resentment, and violence 
ready for export.”
xxvii Far from ensuring stability, Bush and others have argued, Western 
support for autocratic Arab regimes has contributed to political repression, 
underdevelopment and the empowerment of extremist groups. When combined with 
weapons of mass destruction or even a suicide belt, these would strike at the heart of 
Western capitals. It is this threat, more than any other factor, which has spurred the Bush 
administration to embrace the idea of democracy promotion in the greater Middle East as 
a security objective.  
  Many Europeans agree in principle. Europe’s first Security Strategy, approved 
unanimously by European leaders in December 2003, for example, speaks of the need “to 
promote a ring of well-governed countries” in the EU’s volatile eastern and southern 
peripheries, and acknowledges that well-governed democracies constitute “the best 
protection of our security”.
xxviii At the national level, the United Kingdom government 
under the leadership of Prime Minister Tony Blair also has championed this logic, 
providing some of the most elegant deductive arguments for why the West has a security interest in promoting democracy. In March 2005, for instance, Foreign Secretary Jack 
Straw told a Labour Party gathering that the West’s share of responsibility for the dearth 
of democracy in the Arab world “is not down to too much enthusiasm for promoting 
democracy, but too little” and called on Western leaders to “set democracy as our 
compass.”
xxix  
But others within Europe (and other Americans outside of the Bush 
Administration, Democrats and Republicans alike) have a different view. Some have 
posited that greater political liberalization in the Middle East will lead to instability. 
Others worry about that democracy in the Middle East will produce radical, anti-Western 
governments, a development that would not make the United States, Europe, and their 
allies in the region more insecure. In this context, European leaders have reminded their 
American peers that “What is a geostrategic issue for the United States is Europe’s 
backyard.”
xxx  Another set of critics claim that it is precisely Western involvement in the 
internal affairs of countries in the Middle East that has prompted terrorist attacks against 
the United States and Europe in the first place.
xxxi More aggressive attempts to reshape 
political institutions in the region, so the argument goes, will produce less security for 
citizens of the West, not more. Finally, others have questioned the power of democratic 
ideas and institutions in actually reducing the incident of terrorist attacks.
xxxii  
  Despite the absence of agreement between and among European and American 
foreign elites about the utility of democracy promotion as an instrument for enhancing 
Western security, broad based support for the policy of democracy promotion policy still 
remains with European and American publics. In fact, according to a 2005 survey 
commissioned by the German Marshall Fund of the United States and the Compania di 
San Paolo, even more Europeans support the idea than do Americans. When asked if the 
EU should “help establish democracy in others countries” 74 percent of European agreed 
while 22 percent disagreed. When asked a similar question about the United States, 51 
percent of Americans supported the idea that the U.S. should promote democracy abroad, 
while 42 percent did not support the idea.
xxxiii
  In sum, there is broad agreement between American and European elites and their 
publics about the benefits of democracy as a system of government and democracy 
promotion as a foreign policy objective. Tensions between the United States and some 
countries in Europe, which intensified during the first term of the George W. Bush 
administration, have not undermined this deep, fundamental, and normative commitment 
to democracy on both sides of the Atlantic Ocean. A comparison of the chapters on 
Europe and the United States in this volume reveals the shared and similar objectives of 
democratic promotion, not their differences. Elites do differ, however, about the priority 
and practicality of democracy promotion regarding certain countries. Democracy is 
championed by most as a goal worth pursuing, but democratisation—that is the process 
of trying to build democracy – is not embraced universally as a process in every country, 






 DIFFERENT AND SIMILAR STRATEGIES OF DEMOCRACY PROMOTION 
 
  If American and European are united by a normative commitment to democracy 
and the objective of its encouragement outside the transatlantic community, do they also 
embrace the same strategy for achieving this shared goal? The answer we provide 
collectively in this volume is “sometimes, and sometimes not.” Defining and elucidating 
the similarities and differences in democracy promotion strategies between Europe and 
the United Stated is a central theme of this book.  
  At first glance, the differences seem more apparent than the similarities. To date, 
the EU’s principal tool for promoting democracy has been the conditional offer of 
inclusion in the regional governance system itself. The “pull” of the EU is unique among 
international and regional organizations in the world. The Union pulls democratizing 
countries into its orbit and then compels them to consolidate many democratic practices, 
procedures, and institutions before being offered EU membership. In entering the 
“Europe zone” domestic democratic reformers are empowered and democratic practices 
are effectively locked into a liberal regional community. By contrast, the United States is 
perceived as being in the business of “pushing” democracy, or for those critical of 
American foreign policy, of “exporting” democracy, without exposing itself to the risks 
of inclusion within its own body politik. This push model of democracy promotion is 
perceived by some to have a shallower, narrower impact and a more coercive quality to 
it, especially as in Afghanistan and Iraq, when American armed forces are involved in the 
process.
xxxiv The European preference for engagement and integration as a grand strategy 
for democracy promotion also produces sharp differences in approach with the United 
States regarding a number of autocratic regimes such as Cuba and Iran, cases in which 
American officials prefer a coercive, confrontational approach including diplomatic and 
trade isolation, economic sanctions and direct assistance to opposition movements 
seeking to overthrow the dictatorships.
xxxv
  The shifts in the priority assigned to democracy promotion also seems different in 
Europe and the United States, especially after September 11
th and especially with 
reference in the Middle East. President Bush has elevated the focus and attention on 
democracy promotion as a strategic objective of American foreign policy after September 
11
th.  The new emphasis on democracy promotion may have been a radical departure 
from Bush’s pre-September 11
th approach to foreign policy, but it was not a revolutionary 
departure from previous American presidents. Rather, it was the reaffirmation of a 
longstanding tradition in American foreign policy.
xxxvi  This tradition, however, is not 
followed uniformly by all American presidents, but instead zigs and zags in priority 
depending on the preferences of the president and his foreign policy team.  By contrast, 
the increase in attention dedicated by EU institutions and member states to democracy 
promotion in the Middle East is newer, more moderate, but also more steady.   
Further, Europeans tend to have a more expansive definition of what constitutes 
democracy promotion, which includes policies aimed at promoting social modernization, 
trade-related regulatory development, human equality and social solidarity, protection of 
the environment, peaceful resolution of conflict and respect for the principles of the UN 
Charter and international law.
xxxvii Critics charge that this supposedly more holistic 
conceptualization masks a looser definition that in effect underscores the lower priority 
Europeans assign to the business of promoting overtly political democratic institutions and practices. This is reflected in differences of rhetoric used by officials in Brussels 
versus those in Washington that emphasizes a difference in priority and approach. 
Europeans almost never use the word “liberty” and even shy away from “democracy,” 
preferring instead more cautious phrases like “good governance” and “political 
modernization.” Where the “D-word” is used explicitly, it is usually bundled together in a 
pack of principles that also include fundamental rights, the rule of law, good 
neighborliness and respect for international law. 
  Upon closer inspection, however, these caricatures of European versus American 
strategies for democracy promotion only capture part of the story and obfuscate some 
similar strategies and practices. In fact, despite tensions and high politics differences, the 
post-9/11 period has produced notable convergence between American and European 
strategies in the Middle East and North Africa. Europeans – at both the national and 
supranational levels – also deploy push strategies for expanding democracy. Well beyond 
the European neighbourhood, a myriad of European initiatives deploy democratic 
conditionality and provide technical and financial assistance to new democracies that 
have no chance of joining the EU and to democrats struggling to overthrow 
antidemocratic regimes. On rare occasions, European troops have even been deployed in 
the name of promoting democratic regime change, and it is now the EU, not the US, that 
is leading post-conflict reconstruction in the Balkan countries. Similarly, Americans do 
not only practice “push” strategies, but also use American-designed international 
institutions, American markets, and American education and culture to pull 
democratizing countries and their citizens toward the democratic community of states. 
The OAS, NATO, WTO, G-8 and even the OSCE are just some examples of international 
institutions with deep American involvement that have also provided gravity to countries 
in transition.  
  The new policy challenges created by September 11
th, as well as the rise of new 
global powers – notably Brazil, India and China – have produced a demand for policy 
innovation in the field of democracy promotion, an impulse which has prompted learning 
and policy convergence between Europeans and Americans. Because American 
policymakers have become more interested in promoting democratic change in autocratic 
regimes in the Middle East friendly to the United States, the orientation of activities 
under the US’s new Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI) now mirror those of the 
EU’s Barcelona Process, whose mission has been the gradual promotion of political 
change in autocracies friendly to European interests. In the opposite direction, European 
policy makers have begun discussing the idea of a new European Democracy Fund that 
would competitively award financial assistance to developing countries that undertake 
measurable reforms, an approach to aid that the US’s new Millennium Challenge 
Account (MCA) is also seeking to implement.  
  When looking at the specifics of European and American practices in promoting 
democracy within countries beyond the immediate orbit of the EU, the actual programs 
can look very similar. American and European agencies – notably The U.S. Agency for 
International Development (USAID) and the EU’s The European Initiative on 
Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR) and geographic programs (such as MEDA and 
the Lome/Cotonou framework) – fund a similar range of democracy aid projects, 
following a largely standard template of activities. For instance, in the post-Soviet world, 
the American method for fostering the development of civil society is hard to distinguish from a European approach. Likewise, American and European strategies for promoting 
free and fair elections often look very much alike. Sometimes, European and American 
agents of democratic change do promote different policies. The death penalty, for 
instance, is viewed as fundamentally undemocratic by EU Member States, and its 
abolition has been made a formal precondition for accession. EIDHR has made the 
abolition of the death penalty one of its four thematic priorities.
xxxviii In contrast, the 
United States, while it does not actively promote the adoption of the death penalty in 
third countries, clearly sees the relationship between democracy and the death penalty 
differently.  
European and American policymakers and NGOs sometimes promote different 
institutional designs. American rule of law groups, for instance, sometimes push for the 
introduction of jury trials, while Europeans, for the most part, do not. In certain specific 
contexts, including most recently in Afghanistan, American officials have advocated a 
presidential system, a constitutional design rarely invoked by European democracy 
promoters. Yet, even regarding institutional design, it would be a gross 
mischaracterization to posit that Americans and Europeans only promote their own 
systems of government.  Depending on the context, American democracy promoting 
groups are just as likely to recommend proportional representation as they are the 
American first-past-the post electoral system. They are just as likely to push a 
parliamentary democracy as they are a presidential model, and federal as well as unitary 
systems of governments.  
 
 
EXPLAINING SIMILARITIES AND DIFFERENCES 
 
 
  In addition to identifying key differences and similarities in European versus 
American approaches to democracy promotion, we should seek to account for them. We 
want to posit three main factors that might help explain differences, and leave open the 
possibility that the absence of these variables therefore would help, at least in part, 
account for similarities.  
 
History and formative experiences in democracy promotion 
 
First and most obviously is history. The contexts and main formative experiences 
that molded American and European democracy promotion policies have substantially 
varied. Since the birth of the United States, and even before, many American leaders 
have believed that their democratic system of government was not only responsible for 
the country’s freedom and prosperity, but that it made the United States an example and a 
moral force in the world. Some have gone further, extrapolating from this belief an 
operational conclusion; that it was the responsibility of the United States to share its 
experience of democracy with the peoples of the world. Different American 
administrations have placed different emphases on various aspects of democracy – be it 
free and fair elections, human rights, or a robust civil society – and have provided 
different justifications for American involvement, oscillating between “idealism” that 
trumpeted the morality of democracy and the universality of its promise, and “realism” that stressed the benefits of a liberal international political and economic order for 
American national interests. And, the priority accorded to democracy promotion has also 
ebbed and flowed over time, varying both between administrations and even within the 
tenure of the same president.
xxxix Still, no American president has ever denied the 
importance of the objective, and even during the extensive periods when realists 
dominated American foreign policy, the goal was never completely abandoned. Indeed, 
as Larry Diamond and Michael McFaul’s analysis of American democracy promotion 
policies show, President Bush’s embrace of democracy promotion, far from amounting to 
a radical departure from the United State’s foreign policy traditions, represents an 
affirmation of one of its oldest.  
In comparison with the United States, EU Member States are relative new comers 
to the democracy promotion business. As Michael Allen’s chapter on Western European 
national policies shows, prior to the post-1974 wave of democratization Western 
European governments drew largely pessimistic lessons about the efficacy of democracy 
promotion, and the important role played by the European Community in underwriting 
democratic consolidation in Southern Europe in the late 1970s and early 1980s, was only 
gradually grasped by European policy makers. At the same time, the consuming nature of 
post war reunification inside Europe itself, and the restrictions imposed on Western 
governments by the bi-polar international environment have meant that democracy 
promotion emerged as a significant foreign policy objective of Western European 
national governments only in the last two decades. And even the 1990s, the central focus 
on internal changes within the EU often pushed democracy promotion outside of the EU 
to the backburner.
xl A notable exception are the German political party foundations (or 
Stiftungs), which were established in the aftermath of the Second World War, and were 
the first publicly funded (though non-governmental institutions) to support democratic 
institutions and programs in transitional countries – and which provided an important 
model for the establishment of the National Endowment for Democracy (NED) in the 
United States in 1983.
xli  
 Moreover, although the EU, qua EU, has become a leading international actor in 
the promotion of democracy, this is a relatively new development, and one that attests to 
the substantial expansion of the EU’s external ambitions in recent years. In fact, the 
Community/Union did not adopt the objective of promoting democracy until the late 
1980s – and then merely as an ancillary to human rights objectives.
xlii It was only 
following the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, and after several Member States and 
international organizations (notably the World Bank) have entered the fray, that the EU 
proclaimed democracy promotion as an objective. 
A related historical consequence is the fact that the key formative experiences in 
democracy promotion have differed for Americans and Europeans. In essence, the post-
war transformations of Germany and Japan mark the United States’ clearest and most 
profound success in democracy promotion, whereas European leaders view the 
enlargement of the EU to Southern and then Central and Eastern Europe as having proven 
to be the Union’s most successful foreign policy strategy. The degree to which these 
different legacies shape contemporary American and European strategies for democracy 
promotion in different parts of the world is a question debated through several chapters in 
this collection. Still, it is clear that America’s formative experiences have entered current 
policy discussions about Afghanistan, the Balkans, Iraq and the Middle East,
xliii, whereas the enlargement experience continues to guide European thinking about democracy 
promotion in Central and Eastern Europe, Turkey, the Balkans, North Africa, Middle 
East, the caucuses, Central Asia, and beyond.  
 
International “actorship” and its consequences   
 
  A second factor influencing variance in strategy in democracy promotion is the 
fundamentally different types of polities that the United States and the EU represent, 
which in turn determine in large measure how these different actors behave in the 
international system.
xliv Put simply, the United States is a nation-state that is not seeking 
to expand its boundaries, whereas the EU is an evolving regional organization, whose 
Member States (twenty five and growing) are engaged in an ongoing process to create a 
multi-layered supranational governance system.  
This difference creates possibilities and imposes constraints, which go some way 
towards explaining key differences between US and EU approaches. As a modern 
national entity, the United States maintains hard borders and has not taken in new 
Member States for nearly a half century. The history of European integration, in contrast, 
has been one of continuous, peaceful territorial widening – though in the aftermath of the 
“big bang” enlargement of May 1
st 2004, this trend may now be slowing down, with 
important consequences for democratic prospects in Turkey, the Balkans, Eastern Europe 
and the wider Mediterranean region. While the United States maintains a stringent 
separation between “in and out”, the EU has kept the question of borders deliberately 
fuzzy as a means of attracting and impacting the internal governance structures of 
neighbouring countries. Indeed, the EU has turned the conditional prospect of whole or 
partial inclusion in an integrated political and economic community into a sui generis 
strategy for deepening and locking in democratic transformations in peripheral countries 
eager for closer relations. The mechanisms by which the EU has pursued democratic 
enlargement now raise the crucial question of whether Europe’s “cooperative empire”
xlv 
has essentially reached it limits. At the same time, the fragmented nature of EU external 
relations policy - aggravated by reliance on limited treaty provisions, consensus-based 
decision-making procedures, and the cumbersome three pillar system - imposes 
formidable constraints on EU international actions, which American foreign 
policymakers do not face.
xlvi The complexities of policy formation on democracy 
promotion in a multi-level governance system are formidable – involving the taking into 
account of national level policies, as well as the actions of the supranational institutions 
and the gravitas of the EU as an international actor more broadly. Since the early 1990s, 
individual member states of the EU have expanded substantially the scope and budgets of 
their own democracy and human rights promotion programs and resisted pressures to 
surrender national control over these areas of foreign policy competence. Moreover, in 
the last few years, EU member state policies actually diverged in some respects, for 
example over the degree of autonomy of political aid units in national bureaucracies from 
security or other strategically motivated diktats.
xlvii
  However, it would be wrong to assume that the United States government acts as 
a unitary actor with regard to democracy promotion. The process of policy formation on 
democracy promotion within the United States government can be as contentious and 
fragmented as the one in the EU, and can suffer from a similar lack of inter-agency coordination. Coherency is complicated by the presence of many American democracy 
promotion organizations that receive funding from the U.S. government but do not 
always act in accordance with the policies of the U.S. government. 
  
Power and methods of democracy promotion  
 
  A third factor, which may explain differences in strategy, is type and degree of 
power. The United States is a global hegemon with interests and influence in every 
corner of the world. To date, Europe is a regional hegemon with interests and influence 
concentrated mainly, though not exclusively, in its “near abroad.” As the European 
Security Strategy puts it: “Even in an era of globalization, geography is still important. It 
is the European interest that countries on our borders are well-governed.”
xlviii The 
neighbourhood is thus placed in a privileged position in the European security agenda. 
Assuming this asymmetry remains, American leaders will have to develop a wider range 
of tools for promoting democracy in different regions and in different kinds of regimes 
compared to their European counterparts. To pursue this global agenda towards all kinds 
of regimes – from full-blown dictatorships to illiberal democracies— American officials 
have deployed a vast range of tools and policies, including sanctions, covert operations 
and military occupation. With geostrategic interests in fewer countries and with lesser 
resources to project military power and a greater reluctance to use economic sanctions, 
Europe’s toolbox may be smaller or more concentrated on cooperative rather than 
coercive methods. Perhaps most importantly, the United States has the capacity to engage 
or confront most autocratic regimes around the world.
xlix The EU has mainly the capacity 
to engage.  Only in rare exceptions does Europe have the capacity and internal consensus 
necessary to pursue confrontational or coercive strategies for fostering democratic regime 
change. Because the United States at times uses military force to destroy autocratic 
regimes, it must also be in the business of building democratic regime after war, a 
capacity that presumably is less important to the European strategy for democracy 
promotion. 
These power asymmetries also may produce different American and European 
attitudes towards multilateral tools for democracy promotion. The United States has 
never relied on such institutions to conduct its foreign policy. Rather, successive US 
administrations, going as far back as Woodrow Wilson, have been torn between the 
desire to achieve the broad acceptance and legitimacy accorded by multilateral 
institutions, on the one hand, and considerations of decisiveness and utility, on the other.
l 
In contrast, Europeans see multilateralism both as an organizing principle among 
themselves and an essential tool for advancing their foreign policy interests outside of 










COOPERATION, COMPATIBILITY OR COMPETITION? 
  
  In addition to underscoring the shared objectives about democracy promotion in 
Europe and the United States, and then tracing and explaining differences and similarities 
in American and European strategies for promoting democracy, a third and final theme 
that needs to be addressed by scholars of comparative democracy promotion is the 
benefits and pitfalls of greater cooperation between Europe and the United Stats in 
advancing democracy worldwide. Should the US and the EU cooperate in this 
endeavour? Can they cooperate? If so, where and how?  
In the highly charged transatlantic relationship of the last several years, 
commentators and policy-makers have proposed some general and often competing 
answers to these questions. For instance, Michele Dunne has argued that “the idea of 
some kind of common or coordinated effort does not seem feasible or perhaps even 
necessary” since Europe is already far down the road of developing its own strategy, is 
already overburdened by efforts to coordinate among its own member states, and that “in 
any case the United States rarely wants to coordinate on any issue.” Instead she suggests, 
the US and the EU should strive for better complementarity, “which is why this issue 
should remain on the table for frequent discussion.”
  lii In a similar vein, there are those 
who maintain that any European association with American policies diminishes its power 
of influence since it robs Europe of it “credibility”, especially in the Arab world.
liii On a 
different, more placatory note, the EU’s High Representative, Javier Solana, has declared 
that existing American and European strategies “reinforce each other” and that “this 
pluralism in promoting democracy is a source of strength.”
liv Others have called for even 
more comprehensive plans for transatlantic cooperation as a necessity for meeting the 
new and immense challenges of promoting democracy in the Arab world.
lv Certainly, 
analysis of case studies from Syria, Iran and Lebanon suggests a fair amount of common 
ground is actually shared by the two sides, yet with partly competing logics in approaches 
towards democratic reforms in the Middle East.  
Transatlantic cooperation seems essential when practicing some forms of 
democracy promotion. For instance, sanctions only pressure autocratic regimes to change 
if all major powers enforce the sanctions regime. If some countries defect, then sanctions 
are likely to fail. Contrary to conventional wisdom, U.S. and EU economic pressures are 
more effective than usually supposed, especially when pursued together. Similarly, 
diplomatic pressure works best when the West speaks with one voice. The unanimous 
decision by all European countries and the Unites States to not recognize the results of a 
falsified presidential election in Ukraine in November 2004 played a positive role in 
pressuring in compelling the incumbent, President Leonid Kuchma, to back down and all 
the election to be replayed. Had the West not been united, the outcome could have been 
different. On the other hand, there also are most certainly countries in which ties (for 
historical or geographical reasons) to Europe and the United States differ significantly 
and therefore it may be better for Europeans and Americans to pursue their programs for 
democracy promotion independent from each other. By examining in close detail what 
American and European governments and NGOs do to promote democracy and why they 
do it, the chapters that follow aim to provide some guidelines to policymakers about the conditions under which greater cooperation might help the effort and under what 
conditions it should not even be attempted.  
Given that there are significant differences between European and American 
efforts at promoting democracy, can we discern whether some methods and tools are 
better than others? For instance, does the European strategy for promoting democracy in 
pro-Western autocratic regimes work better than American approaches, and therefore 
American officials should learn and change? Is the opposite true? Or are their advantages 
to different methods? Are some European strategies better suited for promoting 
democracy in certain geographic or thematic areas, while the American approach works 
better when dealing with others? Evaluating what works best, when, and where is an 
important and grossly understudied subject. Closer cooperation between American and 
European scholars of democracy promotion is essential in making better determinations 
on the division of labor, actual pursuit and impact of American and European democracy 
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